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1980 TAPOL STATEMENT 
Following the successes achieved so far by the international 
campaign for the release of Indonesian political prisoners, 
in which TAPOL has played a decisive role, TAPOL wishes 
to reaffirm that it will continue to focus attention on the 
general problems of political imprisonment and human 
rights abuses in Indonesia. 
Considering the many remaining problems confronting 
people victimised for alleged involvement in the October 
1965 affair (G30S), TAPOL will campaign for: 
- a decree of abolition and amnesty, abolishing the 
G30S as an event regarding which individuals or groups 
can be victimised, persecuted or sentenced and therefore 
granting amnesty to everyone so treated; 
- the restoration offull civil rights for all released tapols; 
- the immediate release of all tapols who have been 
tried or who are awaiting trial. 
T APOL will also campaign vigorously in support of 
workers, peasants, students and others whose political and 
legal rights are being abused,. and it will opposG press 
censorship. It will do all it can to support the people of 
East Timor and West Irian who face both abuse of their 
individual rights as well as their rights as peoples to the 
exercise of the principle of self-determination. 
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The main obstacles to the restoration of human rights in 
Indonesia are KOPKAMTIBl and the.anti-subversion laws. 
T APOL will therefore campaign for the dissolution of KOP-
KAMTIB and the repeal of the anti-subversion laws. 
In order to reflect TAPOL's broader focus, the name of 
the campaign Will henceforth be as follows: 
TAPOL: British Campaign for the Defence of Political 
Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia. 
Note 
1 KOPKAMTIB is the acronym which denotes the Operational 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. It was 
'temporarily' set up after the 1965 'coup', but still flourishes 
today. 
l 
The writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a tapol for over 14 years, returned home in December 1979 to an 
emotional welcome from his family. During the first nine years in prison, he.was not allowed, like all other 
tapols, to write. But in 1974, after widespread international concern at the restrictions imposed upon him, 
special permission was granted, allowing him to write. He completed eight manuscripts, seven historical 
novels and a play, during his remaining five years on Buru. All had to be surrendered to KOPKAMTIB 
which indicated at the time of his release that they would not permit publication because the texts were 
"too political". 
WHERE IS TRUBUS SUDARSONO?-HE DISAPPEARED 
Sri Sulistiantuti, Trubus' daughter. 
In the midst of the joy that always marks the tapol release 
ceremonies as long-separated families are re-united, many 
tragedies occur. Families who have been trying to trace 
their loved ones for years have attended releases in the hope 
of finding their relative, only to be disappointed. 
2 
One such case is the family of Trubus Sudarsono, a well-
~nown sculptor and artist from Jogjakarta, Central Java. 
Several of his statues still adorn the streets of Jakarta. 
His two daughters who attended the final release cere-
mony in Jakarta on 20 December said that their fat~r had 
disappeared soon after the events in October 1965:*Some 
people claimed that he had been shot dead during the 
massacres, and later his wife wa_s sent his watch and 
clothing but given no explanation about his fate. 
"I do not believe my father is dead. I shall continue to 
believe he is alive till I get definite news about him", said 
one of his daughters, after watching the released prison~rs 
leave (Tempo, 29 December, 1979). Her sister said: "I too 
want to know the whereabouts of my father. If he is still 
under arrest, where is he being held? Ifhe is dead, where is 
his grave?" 
Ths sisters explained that they had been searching for 
their father since 1970. It was only then, after things 
became relatively quiet, that they found the courage to 
start making enquiries. They had enquired about him at 
many prisons, and had writ.ten to Buru for news, only to be 
told that he was not there. As the releases began, they had 
attended many release ceremonies in all parts of Java. The 
ceremony on 20 December was probably their last hope, 
but again they were disappointed. 
*From other sources, T APOL has learnt that Trubus is known to 
have been in one the main Jakarta prisons 
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EX-TAPOL RECEIVES UNICEF AWARD 
A writer named S. Hersri, a political prisoner for thirteen 
years without trial, including ten years at the labour camp 
on the island of Buru, has been granted an award by 
UNICEF for a study he wrote about the process of growing 
up for children of tapols held on the island. The award was 
well publicised in the Indonesian press, and Hersri who was 
released from Buru in December 1978 became the first ex-
tapol to be interviewed on Indonesian television. 
The study which is entitled : " Two Types Within a Single 
Fold: Aspects of Growing up in Buru" , was published last 
October in Prisma, the leading Indonesian journal of the 
social sciences. It provides a very detailed account of the 
mode of living and production of the four thousand or so 
native Ina Kabuki people of Buru who inhabit tiny, 
scattered clusters of houses in the areas immediately con-
tiguous with the labour camp where the political prisoners 
were held. These people still live by hunting and shifting 
cultivation and, until the camp was set up, had had no con-
tact at all with a money economy. 
The arrival of more than ten thousand political prisoners 
most of whom were from Java, who were immediately set 
to work to create what eventually became an advanced 
agricultural project, had a powerful impact on the lives of 
these native inhabitants. Hersri lists . the enormously 
complex infrastructure built by tapol labour which 
included 150 kilometres of road , an extensive drainage 
system with at least fifty kilometres of primary canals , the 
clearance of 3 ,326 hectares of land for the cultivation of 
rice and other crops, the construction of many bridges , 
reservoires, water locks, granneries, churches and mosques, 
as well as numerous storage sheds and workshops for acti-
vities related to the central agricultural pursuits of the 
tapols. The occupation ofland which the native inhabitants 
had formerly used for shifting cultivation resulted in many 
changes in their habits, such as for instance their methods 
of collecting sago. The existence of the camp also brought 
them into sudden contact with money and led to a drastic 
upheaval in their material and spiritual values . 
The social, economic and cultural problems faced by the 
203 tapols who were joined ~y their wives and children and 
who settled in the special unit named Savana Jaya are the 
central focus of the study .1 Economic pressures at the unit 
were very severe particularly during the first few years, 
Branded! 
because of the lack pf ,adequate land and disastrous crop 
failures in the first two years after the families arrived. The 
close proximity of large groups of male prisoners who had 
been isolated for so many years from normal social relation-
ships created pressures which some of these impoverished 
families could not withstand, and some of the homes in 
Savana J aya became virtual brothels . The children at Savana 
Jaya were fully exposed to everything that happened 
among their elders because of the close-knit community 
that developed in the unit which was also grievously lacking 
contact with, and stimulation from the outside . Schooling 
was inadequate; older children wishing to continue to upper 
middle school were not able to get the necessary permission 
from the authorities to go to Ambon where the nearest 
school is situated. Indeed , the families were just as much 
restricted in their movements as the imprisoned fathers . 
The writer observes that the children pursued totally 
different interests from those associated with childhood in 
their places of origin ; they were drawn from a very early 
age into foraging for food , and other such activities, and in 
some cases had to fend for themselves whentheir parents 
became disabled. In one family where the father was 
paralysed, the oldest son had to leave school and take care 
of his sisters after their mother died in childbirth. 
In addition to providing many moving insights into the 
problems faced by the communities that lived side by side 
within and around the Buru prison camp, Hersri has pro-
duced a remarkably comprehensive survey of the social 
and cultural life of the native inhabitants of the island . His 
study represents an important contribution to the ethno-
graphy of Indonesia, and is no small feat for a man who has 
spent so long in detention without access to any scientific 
material and deprived even of writing materials with which 
to record his extensive and detailed observations. 
Note 
1 In December 1979, just over half the Savana Jaya families re-
turned to Java. Eighty-nine families decided to remain there. The 
reasons for their choice are not known, although it is known that 
the Army insisted that all the families would have to pay for 
their journey home themselves. 
Identity cards issued to ex-tapols bear the initials ET. 
A military spokesman , speaking at the release ceremony 
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CITIZENSHIP: WEEDING OUT THE CHINESE 
Amid fulsome praise from foreign journalists, notably in 
the Dutch press and the Far Eastern Economic Review, it 
has been reported that earlier this year President Suharto 
signed two citizenship regulations purporting to speed up 
naturalisation processes for approximately a million ethnic 
Chinese living in Indonesia who are still stateless or hold 
Chinese or Taiwanese citizenship. This followed an 
announcement in November last year by General Yoga 
Sugama, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, that plans are being 
made for the repatriation of about a million Chinese who 
ha:ve not acquired Indonesian nationality, and that special 
camps are being set up as staging places for them (See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No. 37, January 1980). 
Writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review (14 March 
1980), David Jenkins describes the new regulations as a 
"policy about-face" and calls them "remarkably generous": 
Under the new rulings, Jakarta is opening its doors and offering 
ctizenship to virtually all Chinese residents who seek it. Regula-
tions have been streamlined and simplified, and a strict three-
month limit put on the time given to the bureaucracy to process 
any individual application. 
But a close inspection of the regulations shows them to 
be far less generous than Jenkins implies. 
Before examining the regulations in detail , it is necessary 
however to consider whether there has indeed been a 
"policy about-face". Historically, there . has never been a 
truly consistent policy towards the Chinese . as a whole 
and their position has always been undermined by political 
and economic uncertainty. 
Scapegoats for generations 
In the early colonial period, the Dutch used the Chinese to 
achieve their penetration of the Indies market. They 
became the middlemen, providing a useful buffer between 
Dutch exploiters and Indonesian exploited. At the same 
time, the Dutch were at pains to prevent them from 
becoming too influential in the export-oriented colonial 
economy. And the many Chinese who became labourers, 
peasants, small traders or small-holder producers of cash 
crops such as rubber remained poor, under-privileged and 
insecure. 
Since independence, the Chinese have repeatedly been 
victims of policies aimed at strengthening "native" 
(pribumi) Indonesians. The most serious of these policies 
was the regulation introduced in 1960, known as PPl 0, 
which prohibited Chinese from engaging in trade in all 
places below sub-district level, i.e. in all villages where so 
many had been handling commercial activities for genera-
tions. This regulation, introduced by Sukarno under strong 
Army pressure , was rigorously implemented particularly 
after 1965 when the Army came to power. At the same 
time, under the New Order, some Chinese financiers have 
found a comfortable niche (not unlike the situation in 
colonial times) where profits are exchanged foi: patronage 
and brokerage from those in power. 
Nonetheless , the position of even the wealthiest Chinese 
in this system remains insecure. Patronage crumbles when 
the patron loses power; when Jusuf Muda Dalarri, Sukarno's 
minister for central banking affairs , fell, his favoured clients 
fell with him. Patronage creates complex rivalries, so it is 
hardly surprising that the Chinese population as a whole has 
repeatedly been used as a scapegoat. Students complaining 
of the corrupt practices of the generals and their allies also 
attacked big Chinese financial interests, but small Chinese 
traders were the most vulnerable and the generals did not 
hesitate to turn public wrath on them, transforming the 
complaints into manifestations of racialism. 
Sometimes the attacks have taken an ideological form as 
when, shortly after 1965, Chinese traders and peasants in 
West Kalimantan were killed or rounded up into camps, or 
Chinese were driven from their homes in Aceh and deprived 
of their livelihoods, in the post-1965 hysteria against China 
for allegedly supporting Untung's attempted "coup": Again 
in 1968, the Chinese became victims of a showdown 
between two elite corps, the marines (KKO) and the para-
commandos (RPKAD) in Jakarta's Chinese district of 
Glodok. In 19734, Chinese shopkeepers fared badly in 
what were ostensibly demonstrations against Japanese 
investments, but which were manipulated by differing 
interests within the military. One writer has described the 
scapegoat tactic as throwing "Chinese dust into the eyes" l 
of those who complain about the general effects of New 
Order economic strategy and corruption. 
The 1980 Regulations 
Far from being "remarkably generous" , the regulations 
ertacted by Suharto earlier this year are little more than 
window-dressing in the larger arena of realpolitik and trade 
considerations. Commentators generally agree that they are 
related to moves towards a restoration of diplomatic rela-
tions with China. A Chinese delegation will visit Indonesia 
shortly for the 25th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Con-
ference and diplomatic relations will probably be discussed 
then. Vice-President Adam Malik has hinted that direct 
trade ties may be re-established which, despite denials by 
Trade Minister Radius Prawira, would clearly be in Indo-
nesia's interests since China now supplies 15-20% of its rice 
imports through Hong Kong and Singapore where traders 
reap huge benefits from this profitable transit trade. 
Indonesia has always insisted that diplomatic relations 
cannot be resumed before the status of the one million or 
so non-Indonesian citizens has been regularised, for it con-
tends that these people could be used as a fifth column by 
China. The main reasons why s·o many Chinese have failed 
so far to acquire Indonesian citizenship is the hugely exor-
bitant levies, legal and illegal, and the complex bureaucratic 
tangles resulting from the many documents and signatures 
required before an application can be submitted. Naturalisa-
tion can cost as much as three million rupiahs and depends 
greatly on the greed and cussedness of tne particular 
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officials with whom the applicant has to deal. The new 
regulations have done nothing to remove these difficulties. 
The first of the new regulations, Presidential Instruction 
No. 2, 1980 concerns the issuance of nationality certificates 
to those who already consider themselves to be Indonesian 
citizens. August 17 this year has been set as the deadline 
for completion of this. David Jenkins states that about 
100,000 people require such certificates. It remains to be 
seen whether this number of cases can be dealt with in the 
time set and then, what will happen to those who fail to 
obtain certificates by the deadline. 
The second regulation, Presidential Decision No. 13, 
1980 has been introduced "to speed up the handling of 
applications for citizenship" which is necessary in order 
to clarify and establish the status and legal guarantees for every 
inhabitant of Indonesia in the framework of ensuring national 
stability and strengthening national defence. 
Thus, the link with security considerations has been firmly 
established. 
The Decision lists no fewer than eleven documents 
required with an application: a birth certificate, an immi-
gration certificate confirming residence in Indonesia, a 
certificate of notification, a good-conduct certificate from 
the police, a marriage certificate or in the case of non-
married women proof of single status, a health certificate, 
proof that the naturalisation fee has been paid, proof that 
the applicant receives a regular income, proof that the 
applicant will hold no other nationality, proof that district 
court costs have been paid, and a passport photograph. 
The documents almost all entail lengthy and costly 
bureaucratic wrangles. The naturalisation fee is particularly 
onerous. A regulation passed in 1968 set the amount at 
between Rp 30,000 and Rp 100,000, and stipulated that 
the amount should not exceed a month's income. But the 
wording is such as to be interpreted as meaning that the 
applicant must have a monthly income of at least Rp 
30,000 which precludes a very large number of people. The 
new regulation stipulates that the applicant must have a 
regular income, but many Chinese will not be able to 
comply. Trading restrictions and the many harassments in-
flicted on the poorer ethnic 'Chinese have deprived them of 
jobs or regular livelihoods. This would affect the tens of 
thousands still living in refugee camps in North Sumatra and 
West Kalimantan, and many more besides. Possibly some 
ex-tapols of Chinese origin could also be facing this 
problem. According to some estimates, about one-half of 
the 850,000 ethnic Chinese who might be expected to 
apply for citizenship are prevented from doing so because 
of such income and financial requirements. 
Security Checks 
The regulation also stipulates that each application must be 
vetted by BAKIN, the state intelligence agency. In other 
words, a se~urity check of every single applicant will be 
made. The chances of pressure, intimidation and corrup-
tion over this particular requirement are virtually limitless. 
Moreover no appeals procedure is provided in cases where 
BAKIN rejects an application. Besides signing an oath of 
loyalty, applicants will also be tested in their fluency of 
Indonesian and knowledge of Indonesian history·! 
If the Indonesian authorities indeed wanted to be 
generous in their naturalisation policy and humanitarian 
towards Chinese who have lived in the country for genera-
tions, the most effective way would be to make provision 
for naturalisation free of charge . Only then would the 
major obstacles be removed for the hundreds of thousands 
who cannot afford the procedures as they now stand. 
Note 
1 Adil Rakindo, "Chinese Scapegoat Politics in Suharto's 'New 
Order'", pp. 125-139 in Malcolm Caldwell et al. Ten Years' 
Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman Books, 1975, 
POLITICAL TERRORISM 
IN INDONESIA 
" ... Political terrorism is part of the 'anything goes' 
system so widespread in Indonesia, and is sometimes 
carried on on a mercenary basis (special operations). 
The methods include: having the houses of people 
disliked by the regime stoned; sending anonymous 
letters; intimidation with weapons or less direct 
means; organising hooligans and mafia-type groups to 
frighten people disliked by those in power; night-
time operations to plant leaflets on people's door-
steps; sending transvestites in to cause chaos among 
demonstrators, and then arresting these transvestites, 
and demonstrators; hiring professional killers to 
commit murders with watertight alibis; hiring prosti-
tutes to tail political notables; sending in apparent 
madmen or idiots to student meetings or any activity 
the regime distrusts; hiring 'masseuses' to hang 
around the lobbies of political conferences; installing 
bugs in meeting-rooms; infiltrating informants into 
'suspicious' meetings of Islamic scholars; making 
amonia bombs to be exploded during dramatic per-
formances critical of the government; hiring people to 
pretend to be reporters taking pictures; ordering 
military men to pose as rickshaw-drivers, roadside 
food-vendors, etc. in the context of 'total intelligence 
operations' ... " 
From: Indonesia Dibawah Sepatu Lars (Indonesia 
Under the Jackboot), Defence plea of Mr 
Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, formerly caretaker 
chairman of Bandung Institute of Technology 
Students' Union, during his trial which ended late 
last year. 
TAPOL Bulletin No 38 March 1980 5 
HERIAKHMADION 
STUDENT TRIALS AND NORMALISATION 
(taken from Kampus, December 1979 as reprinted in Berita 
dan Analisa, December 1979) 
Slightly abridged translation. 
The following is taken from an interview given to Kampus, the journal of the Students Council of the 
Bandung Institute of Technology, by the ex-chairman of the Council who was one of the defendants in the 
student trials. His criticism of the regime's philosophical justification for "campus normalisation" is of 
particular interest at a time when student actions to reject the policy are intensifying. 
Heri was sentenced to two years' imprisonment earlier this year. 
Each of the student trials took place in similar circumstances 
-with a stifling atmosphere, tight security on visitors and 
other measures. Many of the student-defendants' rights 
were violated, including the right to submit statements on 
the basic aspects of the cases which were concerned with 
the appalling state of the national leadership and its conse-
quences for society . This had been the theme of the student 
actions. So there were tight restrictions on explanations of 
the principles and objectives of the student movement. The 
trials were conducted as if the defendants were petty 
thieves. During questioning, the judges tried, with the help 
of the prosecutors, to extract confessions from the defen-
dants by asking leading questions, to ensure that the sen-
tences when passed would appear to be justified. 
Besides seeking to establish the truth, the courts should 
also administer justice. This was not done. The defendants 
were interrupted as they spoke, they were not granted 
permission to call witnesses, and were not even allowed to 
explain the basic problems which had led to the trials being 
held. Newspapers were banned from reporting the trials. 
The 1979 student trials can indeed be said to have con-
formed with the scenario prepared by those in power-using 
the trials as a way to punish their opponents and to intimi-
date society. It was possible to do this because the judiciary 
is heavily dependent on those in power for the livelihood of 
its personnel, even of the judges. It is not yet in a position 
to regulate and pay the people involved. 
This is all in the hands of the government. It is now so 
bad that even the judges are required to join KORPRI (Civil 
Servants' Corps of the Republic of Indonesia) and to belong 
to GOLKARl. 
In view of the restrictions, the defendants decided to put 
everything they had to say in the defence pleas, their 
thoughts, explanations and responses to the charges. It was 
as if they were exerting themselves to produce "monu-
ments" because this was their only chance to explain things 
to the public: what the student movement had sought to 
achieve and what it would continue to do in pursuit of its 
aspirations. 
But, alas, even the defence pleas could not escape 
censorship. My own plea, entitled Smash the Yoke of 
Oppression of the Indonesian People was banned from dis-
tribution, even when my trial was still in progress. 
Nevertheless, all of us from the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) had decided in consultation that we 
wanted to go before the courts and expose the brutalities 
committed by those in power, the arbitrary arrests, and the 
attempts made by the rulers to force their will on the 
students in 1978. And I think we have achieved this. 
Society now knows just how viciously the students were 
treated, just as common people are treated when for 
instance petty traders are forcibly removed from the 
streets. 
By means of the trials and the defence pleas, we were 
able to disseminate everything we know about the irregu-
1 arities practised by the national leadership and about the 
nature of their development policy. The authoritarian, 
dictatorial system created in the Suharto regime protects 
the avarice of the rulers, their relatives an.d cronies who are 
enriching themselves and living lives of luxury. We showed 
how officials conspire with Chinese businessmen to exploit 
the people, how they conspire with foreign investors to 
plunder Indonesia's natural resources, how socio-political 
forces have been paralysed to prevent them from inter-
fering with the corrupt, illegal practices of those in power. 
The President-Suharto himself-is ultimately to blame for 
all this, for he not only fails to prevent such things from 
happening, buthe even gives them his blessing and sets the 
example. A member of his family has been given the lucra-
tive cloves monopoly which is earning him thousands of 
millions of rupiahs in profits and he also has forestry con-
cessions and use-rights over plantation lands2. Others in 
his family have shown the way in conspiring with Chinese 
businessmen and foreign investors. The Berkeley mafia3 is 
entrenched in Senopati Square4 where it has produced an 
ultra-conservative, anti-people's plan. The plan is liberal and 
capitalistic, using the free market as the chief mechanism in 
the economy. It only benefits businesses that have strong 
capital assets and advanced managerial techniques, that is to 
say, the Chinese businessmen and the foreign investors. 
Meanwhile, the people's economy goes from bad to worse 
with each passing day. 
The Suharto regime has reached the point where it must 
use all means possible, including armed force, to stay in 
power and to safeguard the interests and the wealth of its 
cronies from the seething anger of the people which could 
explode at any moment and destroy them. The regime, 
strichn with fear and panic,. will use all possible means, the 
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foulest and the most violent, to suppress poor and starving 
people who find themselves trapped by every single policy 
measure taken by those in power. The rulers have used 
violence and oppression in almost all parts of the country. 
On Normalisation of the Campuses 
The KNK and NKK5 are instruments with which those in 
power can suppress voices that threaten the Suharto regime 
and endanger the wealth of its cronies (corrupt officials, 
Chinese businessmen and foreign investors). In the eyes of 
those in power, normalisation of the campuses will mean 
that all posts on the campus will become part of the 
bureaucracy, whereas the student movement will be 
eliminated. And in order to confuse us, they speak about it 
as a technostructural society, which is none other than 
authoritarianism and bureaucracy. 
There are two components in KNK: logic (penalaran )6 
and technostructure. Logic as part of normalisation-style 
education is aimed at creating analytical beings who will 
some day hold leading positions in the technostructural 
society. But is logic alone enough? No, certainly not! 
Logic alone turns scientists into nothing more than com-
puters who consume data, process it and produce analyses 
that conform to the formulae already imbibed. If academic 
life is based on logic alone, our universities will revert to the 
era of rationalism which has already been abandoned. 
Rationalism means a tyranny of ideas, estranging the uni-
versities from real life. Rationalism produces lofty ideas 
and top-quality analysis that is quite inapplicable and irrele-
vant to the realities existing in society; analyses of this kind 
end up covered in dust in the archives. Progress in today's 
world of science is characterised by the employment of 
scientific method that is based on experimental investiga-
tion as well as logic; this involves the collection of data, the 
quantification of data and so on. Academic freedom is the 
key to such a method, in particular the freedom to collect 
data. This is what our academic institutions lack: data has 
dried up because investigations are seriously hampered by 
complicated formalities to get the necessary permits. And 
the mass media too can only print the dregs l~ft by the cen-
sors. With tight restrictions on the collection of data, 
especially in the social sciences, academic life will become 
very shallow indeed if it is only allowed to practise logic as 
envisaged within the concept of campus normalisation. 
That those in power intend to paralyse academic life as 
a force of dynamism in society and turn the universities 
into government departments responsible for churning out 
experts is abundantly clear from the function that has been 
designed for intellectuals in the technostructure. Intellec-
Continued on pa,;e 16 
STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST 'NORMALISATION' 
Several hundred students, including representatives from 43 
universities and colleges throughout the country, demon-
strated at the Indonesian Parliament on 11 February in 
protest against the government's policy of 'campus 
normalisation' and called for the dismissal of the Minister 
of Education, Daoed Yusuf. 
Student protest against this policy has been intensifying 
for a number of months. The policy would mean an end to 
democratic student councils and would prevent students 
from participating in any political activity. 
The demonstration outside Parliament took place as 
Members were voting on a proposal by the two non-govern-
ment parties, the PPP (Moslem) and the PDI (Nationalist 
and Christian), that Parliament should exercise its right of 
enquiry to question the government about "normalisation". 
MPs from the two parties were heavily outnumbered by 
members from the Army-backed GOLKAR party and ihe 
appointed members from the Armed Forces, and the 
motion was defeated. The defeat brings to an end a long 
campaign by students to press their grievances upon the 
government through legal and constitutional channels. 
Some of the demonstrators had tried to visit President 
Suharto but were prevented from doing so by heavily 
anned riot troops. They also failed to meet members of the 
Supreme Advisory Council. All major buildings and inter-
sections in the centre of Jakarta were tightly guarded 
during the day. 
Helicopter Crash 
As the students were returning to the University of 
Indonesia campus in Jakarta, a police helicopter hovered so 
low over their convoy of trucks that the students below had 
to duck to avoid the powerful gusts of wind and heat. The 
helicopter went out of control and crashed within feet of 
the trucks, only narrowly avoiding what could have been a 
very serious accident in terms of human life. 
The demonstration came as the climax to a series of 
actions and demonstrations in Jakarta, Bandung and other 
cities. On one occasion, students were prevented from 
burning an effigy of the Education Minister, and on another 
occasion, in Ujung Pandang, the Minister was compelled to 
leave the university campus secretly and could not attend a 
luncheon held in his honour because of the large number of 
students demonstrating at major points throughout the 
campus. 
The students who gathered in Jakarta to attend the 
demonstration before Parliament on 11 February adopted a 
Student Proclamation reaffirming their determination to 
preserve democratic student council constitutions, and to 
resist all attempts to restrict their freedoms. They also 
adopted a series of demands, calling for the dismissal of the 
Education Minister, Daoed Yusuf, and urging the govern-
ment to eliminate all forms of the misuse of power and to 
take measures to resolve the widespread social unrest in 
Indonesia. 
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The small population , rugged terrain and remote location of 
the island of Kalimantan have ensured that many of its 
secrets have been kept from the outside world. Yet a num-
ber of disquieting reports have indicated that the grab for 
rapid profits by timber companies and their In.donesian 
brokers and the government's obsession with "security" 
have resulted in a pogrom , ethnocide or the deliberate 
destruction of a culture , forced resettlements , and wide-
spread use of forced labour. At the same time Kalimantan 
itself has become threatened by the environmental deva-
station which has rendered many of the world's former 
great forest areas unfit for human or animal habitation. The 
Philippines example of over-exploitation of forest areas is 
comparable and sobering, and directly relevant, because 
once the plunder of the Philippines forests was complete, 
the timber companies spread their relentless trail of destruc-
tion into Kalimantan. 
Kalimantan has become an exceptionally important 
source of revenue to the Indonesian government. Indonesia 
is now the world's leading exporter of tropical hardwood 
logs; from April 1978 to April 1979 earnings were approxi-
mately $1 billion in timber exports. Since 1978 the price of 
Kalimantan meranti samarinda logs has almost doubled so 
that at least another year of windfall profits may be 
... pogrom, ethnocide ... forced resettle-
ments, widespread use of forced labour, ... 
environmental devastation ... 
expected. Despite early temporary set-backs related to 
fluctuating market prices, the expansion of the Indonesian 
logging industry has been phenomenal. In 1966 the log 
output was 2.6 million cubic metres, while in 1979-80 it is 
targeted at 30 million cubic metres of which 18.5 million 
cubic metres are marked as log exports. Earnings are 
expected to be worth at least $1.6 billion, accounting for_ 
13% of total exports and 50% of non-oil export earnings. 
The main customers are Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
who together take nearly 90% of the log exports. Kaliman-
tan timber provides the major part of these earnings. 
The breathless admiration which characterises many 
reports of the Kalimantan timber industry cannot conceal 
the far-reaching negative implications for several groups of 
people on the island. In different ways, but for the same 
reasons, Chinese settlers, the Dyak population and political 
prisoners have all become victims of a rapacious and 
ruthless exploitation of the forests which has pushed them 
from their agricultural lands and endangered the future of 
all who have to live on the island after the companies and 
their Indonesian allies have moved on . Finally the benefits 
to the Indonesian economy as a whole are at best short-
term and limited, and the Indonesian brokers, the Jakarta 
generals and local officials have proved unable to protect 
Indonesia's longterm interests against the wiles of 
experienced multi-nationals, and for the most part have 
been content merely to take the profits while the going is 
good. 
WHA1~'S GOING OJ 
... where plants, ins1 
have become 'pests'~ 
Wilful Destruction: Dubious Benefits 
The exceptional rapacity of the exploi.tation of Kalim~n­
tan's timber may be judged by the amazmg degree to which 
production targets have been exceeded: 
TABLE tl 
Target Output 
(million cubic metres) 
1969-70 1.2 
1973-74 5.1 
Actual Output 
(million cubic metres) 
4.6 
21.5 
In 1971, 70% of all exported timber came from East Kali-
man tan alone. Generally Indonesian companies have taken 
large concessions in Kalimantan, but lacking the capital to 
exploit them, have invited foreign companies to provide the 
capital. 
The style of operation of the foreign companies is well-
illustrated by the US giant company, Weyerhaeuser. For 
over a decade Weyerhaeuser extracted large profits from its 
Philippines holdings, and when the last stands of timber 
were exhausted, Weyerhaeuser obtained, through its first 
wholly-owned Indonesian subsidiary, P.T. Weyerhaeuser 
Indonesia, a concession of 250,000 hectares in December 
1969. In June 1971 Weyerhaeuser acquired a 65% interest 
in P.T. International Timber Corporation Indonesia (ICTI). 
In this venture Weyerhaeuser's partner is P.T. Indonesian 
Regional Development Agency, a subsidiary of P.T. Tri 
Usaha Bhakti, which is a private Department of Defence-
controlled holding company. In this particular transaction 
73 of Indonesia's top leaders were reportedly granted the 
concession by President Suharto himself in a bid to ensure 
their loyalty. In return for their 35% of the profits, and an 
initial pay-off by Weyerhaeuser of $3.5 million, the generals 
merely had to provide the licence for the concession. 
Initially Weyerhaeuser took out two insurance policies, 
mainly against political instability, for ICTI, but by late 
1977 , so confident was Weyerhaeuser in the security of the 
area, that the policies were cancelled. 
The lure of rapid returns and the generous terms of 
Suharto's 1967 investment law caused a large inflow of 
applications from foreign companies. Dazzled at first by the 
opportunities for participating in the great rip-off, Indo-
nesian officials welcomed the companies unreservedly, but 
the honeymoon was soon to pall. By late 1968 applications 
from Philippines companies were theoretically to be 
rejected, as with the exhaustion of the Philippines timber 
industry, it was rightly felt that Philippines investors were 
simply acting as brokers for Indonesian timber on the world 
market. Many infringements of regulations were noted and 
as early as 1969 a forestry seminar at the University of 
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ts, animals and people 
Gajah Mada expressed concern at the fact that unregulated 
felling had caused a dangerous spread of alang-alang grass, 
the scourge resulting from indiscriminate destruction of 
ground cover, and which has devastated large areas of 
formerly productive land in Southeast Asia. 
Eventually those who had most to gain from the timber 
industry realised that the pace and voracity of the logging 
operations threatened their own interests. Timber was being 
exported at its lowest unprocessed value when many more 
profits could be made for Indonesian brokers if the timber 
were processed inside Indonesia. The foreign investors were 
indeed investing very little capital in comparison with their 
returns. Accordingly, in the pursuit of value added gains the 
Indonesian authorities now demanded that concessionaries 
must set up processing plants within three years of ' 
commencing felling, and that 60% of the logs must be pro-
cessed within ten years. However the government has been 
unable to enforce these demands as the penalty clauses 
involve time-consuming legal processes and in fact the crux 
of the matter has been aptly summed. up in the Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies by K. G. Koehler2 who says, 
The arbitration procedures laid down in the contracts, further-
more, tend to be so time consuming that it is not likely that any 
disputes could be quickly settled. Under these circumstances, the 
crucial problem seems to be the criteria which determine the 
short-range behaviour of foreign investors in East Kalimantan. 
(Our emphasis-ed.) 
Meanwhile Indonesia's imports of processed wood products 
have been rising steadily to a record value of $122 million 
in 1978. 60% of Indonesia's paper supplies are imported, 
including its entire newsprint needs. 
Environmental Costs 
Timber companies operating in Kalimantan have been able 
to violate selective cutting agreements and then abandon 
their concessions once all the virgin forest has been cut 
down. Some, like Weyerhaeuser have opted to switch to 
monoculture plantation crops on the cut areas of their 
concessions. They have introduced fast-growing pines and 
eucalypts, thus destroying any chance of regeneration of 
the natural forest. This policy has serious implications for a 
natural habitat like that of Kalimantan. 
Kalimantan covers an area of 208,000 square miles, 
divided into four administrative areas, West Kalimantan, 
Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and East Kaliman-
tan. Of the 6 million inhabitants 2.5 million are Moslem 
Malays, over half a million are Chinese and the remainder 
are the autochthonous people, the Dyaks. The diversity of 
the jungle itself is immense with its many varieties of trees, 
flowering plants, animals and insects. Simulating the diver-
sity of the jungle, the Dyaks practice swidden (or "slash-
and-burn ") agriculture, a delicately balanced but sucessful 
system in which root-crops, legumes, grains, vines and fruits 
may all be grown in the same area of cultivation. Forest 
cover is essential for the maintenance of the system in pro-
viding humus or a cover of nutrient material in the form of 
rotting vegetation, and a natural umbrella which protects 
the soil from being leached by excessive exposure to 
tropical rains. As long as this system operates a sufficiently 
long period of rotation or long fallow and short cultivation 
periods, with a low population density (around 45/square 
km .), the system is stable. 
The seizure of vast tracks of forest has limited the areas 
of land available to the swidden cultivators, or in many 
cases has forced them to move to less fertile areas where the 
swidden system becomes unviable. The obvious devastation 
of Kalimantan cannot be denied and it has suited the 
government to blame the Dyaks for it, claiming that the 
swidden system is primitive and destructive. Damage attri-
buted to swidden agriculture is hard to believe when Kali-
man tan is so large and once so well forested with a very low 
population density. On the other hand the requirements of 
the timber companies, the denuding of the landscape and 
the substitution of monocultural crops, have created 
"pests" of Kalimantan's plant, insect, animal and human 
populations. This fact has determined the fates of the 
Dyaks, the Chinese and the prisoner/transmigrants of 
Kalimantan . 
The Dyaks: Ethnocide 
Today the Dyaks and their culture are under severe attack 
as the government makes a concerted attempt to "civilise" 
them. Taking the government line of attack, David Jenkins 
of -the Far Eastern Economic Review (30 June 1978), 
writes that over the past l 00 years the Dyaks have "moved 
like locusts across a once-green landscape, practising a 
primitive slash-and-burn agriculture that has upset a finely-
balanced eco-system" . Yet in his finely argued discussion of 
swidden agriculture in his famous study, Agricultural Invo-
lution, Clifford Geertz presents swidden agriculture as being 
very much in harmony with the natural environment. But 
David Jenkins argues that ecologically the Dyaks are "at 
the end of the road". Can it really be that Geertz was 
wrong and that less than 3 million swidden cultivators were 
too many for the vast timbered areas of Kalimantan? Or 
was it the fault of the government and the timber conces-
sionaries who pushed the Dyak cultivators into unviable 
areas? 
Part of the answer is in fact provided by David Jenkins 
himself. He observes that the Dyaks have found that certain 
areas of West Kalimantan have been designated as resettle-
ment areas for Javanese transmigran ts. In 1978-9 it was 
announced that almost 5 ,000 people would be moved into 
areas not far from the Kalimantan border with Sarawak. 
The government has in fact been somewhat defensive about 
the policy. The Javanese head of the provincial transmi-
gration office is quoted by Jenkins as saying that the pro-
gramme can only be beneficial to the Dyaks, who "will 
learn from the Javanese". He added that the Dyaks can 
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learn to cultivate rice in the lowland areas, confirming that 
they are to be moved from traditional areas of cultivation. 
He claimed too that the land taken over for the project was 
"not used" by the Dyaks. This completely ignores the long 
fallow ·periods which are allowed for the regeneration of the 
jungle in the swidden system. And if the land were not 
under fallow/regeneration, it is notoriously difficult for the 
untutored and the scornful to distinguish between the 
natural forest and areas actually under swidden cultivation, 
so well-tuned is the swidden eco-system to its wider 
environment. 
Several justifications have been used for the seizure of 
Dyak land. Part of the "civilising mission" has focussed on 
the Dyak longhouses, the heart of Dyak culture and 
community. The longhouses are impressive structures of up 
to 400 yards long and may contain up to 100 apartments, 
and they are the physical manifestation of a strong sense of 
community and of security in that community. Members 
of the government who have not seen fit to consult anthro-
pologists any more than ecologists, have defined this 
embodiment of community as "communism" and therefore 
the longhouses must be destroyed . Just as extreme and ill-
informed is the government view that the practice of 
housing so many people under one roof encourages pro-
miscuity, loose morals and sexual orgies. David Jenkins 
quotes one well-informed observer as saying that the 
government is not exactly consistent in its claims about the 
Dyaks, 
In places where there has been a security threat (e.g. the border 
areas-ed.) they say the longhouses are based on the communist 
way of life .. . In places where there are no communists they say 
they are worried about the danger of fire and disease. It is per-
fectly clear that they just want to get rid of them.3 
The destruction of Dyak culture or ethnocide is pro• 
ceeding apace and no matter what the reasons given, the 
true reasons are very much murkier. There are now very 
few longlfouses left in Kalimantan as they have been pulled 
down. There are several reports of government agents 
burning down longhouses, and shots have been fired into 
longhouses on more than one occasion. For all the stated 
concern about the alleged destruction caused by the Dyak 
way of life, there has not been a single instance where the 
government has attempted well-informed and well-
intentioned agricultural work among the Dyaks. The only 
extension has been the steady encroachment of the timber 
companies and to a lesser extent of the transmigration 
settlements. 
One of the foremost concerns of foreign investors is 
with the security of their investment, and it is obvious that 
Jakarta generals and provincial officials have not allowed 
security considerations to stand in the way of short-term 
gains any more than ecological considerations have. In the 
early days of the New Order, coinciding with the beginning 
of the timber boom, West Kalimantan, especially the area 
bordering with Sarawak, was regarded as a serious security 
risk and it became essentiai for the government to clear out 
the pro-Sukarno guerrillas who had been operating in the 
Confrontation with Malaysia, as well as PKI survivors 
who also operated within the area. The government were 
able to use the Dyaks to solve this pressing security 
problem which involved the Chinese population of 
Kaliman tan . 
Dealing with the Chinese: Pogrom and Forced 
Resettlement 
From the mid-18th century onwards many Hakka and 
Teochin Chinese migrated to West Kalimantan, initially 
attracted by work in the gold-fields. Their de~cendants 
remained as settlers, mainly engaged in small-scale cash 
crop farming and some wet rice agriculture. Many lived in 
the interior in harmony with the Dyak population. In late 
1967 however, the government successfully incited the 
Dyaks to massacre the Chinese after its own attempts to 
round them up had failed. This strategy of "Peoples' War" 
has been described by an Indonesian officer, 
We convinced the Dyaks that the Communists were their 
enemies. We mobilised some of them into a Civil Defence Corps 
and armed them with Lee Enfield rifles. They killed many 
guerrillas .. . We have only two battalions of our own to guard 
the border (about 1,300 kilometres). Do you think we could 
have driven out the guerrillas without Dyak help?4 
Three thousand Chinese were killed in this exercise and 
some 50,000 fled to the coastal towns as refugees. Taking 
advantage of this the government then decreed that the 
resettlement camps for the Chinese refugees would be away 
from the coast and from the Sarawak border-in the 
interests of security. Many have been employed in clearing 
forest, and adding to the army's gains, 150 ex-servicemen 
through an army housing scheme, have been given land 
"abandoned" by the Chinese in the kabupaten of 
Pontianak5. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that 
the Dyaks too should have their turn of falling foul of the 
government's "security" requirements. 
The enforced confinement_ of a large number 
of Chinese ... has simplified matters ... 
The enforced confinement of a large number of Chinese 
in Kalimantan has simplified matters on subsequent 
sensitive occasions. For example, during the 1971 elections, 
the military commander of West Kalimantan ordered the 
Chinese not to travel, and also ordered his troops to shoot 
any "trouble-makers" on sight6. A recent report in 
Angkatan Bersenjata (7 May 1979) has added a little to the 
limited press coverage of the resettlement of Chinese in 
Kalimantan, mainly from the border districts. Now 
"special" districts have been prepared for them, and they 
will not be allowed to leave. Their numbers will be swollen 
by settlers from other districts, but it has not been specified 
whether these will be former tapols or not. The government 
then claims that it is not trying to isolate the Chinese, but 
is helping them to integrate with other transmigrants. It is 
perhaps telling that these areas have not been designated by 
the provincial transmigration authority, but by none other 
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than the provincial representative of KOPKAMTIB, indica-
ting that security considerations are paramount. It is also 
perhaps significant that this policy was discussed by the 
governor of West Kalimantan, Soejiman at the release 
ceremony for G30S detainees in Kalimantan on 27 April 
1979. 
Prisoners/Transmigrants: A Captive Labour Force? 
In Tapol Bulletin No 34. (1979), fears were expressed that 
the government has been using a variety of means to force 
former tapols to "voluntarily" opt to remain as "trans-
migrants" in Kalimantan. Some of the resettlement camps, 
at least Amborawang and Pararapak, appear to be situated 
inside the forestry concessions of Inhutan and Barito Baru 
respectively, raising the possibility that these "settlers" are 
used as forced labour or to supply food and other services 
to the forestry camps and towns. Amborawang has been 
regarded by military authorities as the "beach-head" of 
development for East Kalimantan and a recent Tempo 
report (26 January 1980) reveals that there are now 127 
families living in the Amborawang camp, but "only 96 
families (42 of which are headed by former Armed Forces 
personnel) are living in houses". The rest are forced to live 
in barracks despite a promise by Admiral Sudomo at the 
end of 1977 that within two years 500 houses would be 
built and no one would have to live in barracks. Influenced 
by this promise some tapols agreed to go to Amborawang 
only to find that the promised housing did not materialise. 
We are not allowed to go home, yet there are 
no facilities here. 
Tapol labour has certainly been used to build the houses 
which have been constructed so far. A former tapol, Kusdi, 
explained in the Tempo report that he had built several 
houses but had not yet been paid. He also indicated that 
former tapols are being held against their wills in the camp 
and stated that he wished to return to his family in the Pari 
district, 
But the Laksusda 7 has asked us to remain here. We are not 
allowed to go home, yet there are no facilities here. 
Conditions in the camp are extremely difficult. Tools 
promised by the government have not materialised, the soil 
is poor and the tapols are forced to seek work as labourers 
outside the camp in order to subsist. 
Families in the Jilatan settlement in South Kalimantan 
are also experiencing hardship, but curiously they are very 
reticent about their obvious hardship. This might be 
explained by the fact that the "settlers" are former tapols 
and their families, and they are under the supervision of the 
local military command, or "under regional guidance" as 
KOPKAMTIB puts it. Yet the prisoners are theoretically 
released and subject to the same conditions as other trans-
migrants. Because of the transport difficulties and remote-
ness of Kalimantan, there is ample reason to fear that such 
reports represent only a fraction of widespread abuses. 
Obviously it is in the interests of the government to 
populate the "secure" areas of Kalimantan, as it has always 
been difficult to supply the labour and service requirements 
of the concessionaries. At first it was necessary to import 
labourers from the Philippines and Malaysia. It is also 
necessary that the labour force is subdued and easy to 
control so that there can be no redress against the 
notoriously exploitative working conditions in the con-
cession areas. The dispossessed Dyaks and Chinese and the 
captive tapols (many of whom are Dyaks and Chinese) can 
supply this need. The immediate implications about the 
fates of these people are distressing enough, hut the long-
term effects of a reckless and rapacious plunder of the 
forests for those who remain long after the investors and 
their brokers depart, promise to be equally dire. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Annual Report on Fundamental Human Rights in Indonesia 
1979, (ed.) T. Mulya Lubis and Fauzi Abdullah. Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum, Jakarta, 1979. 
The Legal Aid Institute has taken a valuable step forward 
with the publication of this, the first, of their annual 
reports on human rights in Indonesia. A legal aid institute 
could, if it wished, confine itself to the provision of legal 
counsel free of charge to those who cannot afford it. In 
Indonesia it has interpreted its brief much more broadly 
and is becoming the major forum for criticising abuses and 
pressing for changes in the law that would improve the 
rights of Indonesian citizens. 
This Annual Report also makes it clear that the Institute 
does not confine its understanding of human rights to 
political and legal rights but extends ·it to include social, 
economic and cultural rights as well. It therefore includes 
chapters on a variety of topics: education, health, income, 
basic needs, employment opportunities, press freedom, 
participation in state affairs and the right to justice. But it 
acknowledges that its access to information about abuses is 
very limited indeed: 
If all would speak up, if all the information in the villages could 
be gathered, it would perhaps struck us dumbfounded (sic). We 
have to honestly admit that we don't know much about what 
happened in remote corners of our country. 
Indonesia's two provisional constitutions of 1949 and 
1950 were far better on human rights than the 1945 Con-
stitution, the one restored by President Sukarno in 1959 
under pressure from the Army which was by then 
increasingly interfering in political affairs. In tracing the 
post-1965 New Order claims to restore the rule of law, 
which had been severely battered under Sukarno by the 
abandonment of the trias politicas principle, the Report 
suggests that "the New Order truly utilized the law as a 
legitimate means of power. If the law is non-existent, then 
it was immediately drawn up". From the examples that 
follow this extraordinary statement, one can only assume 
that it is intended as an ironic comment on how laws have 
been used to perpetuate unlawful and unconstitutional 
institutions such as KOPKAMTIB, and to abrogate consti-
tutionally-affinned rights by means of the "simplification" 
of party political life. 
On some of the most crucial aspects of the way in which 
military rule was established in 1965, the Report is incon-
sistent in its adherence to human rights principles. When 
describing the immediate post-1965 period, it asserts that 
"we really found an atmosphere of political freedom, free-
dom to express opinion and freedom to associate". Yet 
this was a period when dozens of organisations with a com-
bined membership of many millions were banned, when 
hundreds of thousands were killed for their alleged political 
affiliations, and hundreds of thousands more thrown into 
prison, and when numerous newspapers were prohibited. 
But in a later chapter, the Report redeems itself by 
referring to the problem of the G30S/PKI political 
prisoners as the 
gravest violation against human rights ~ver done by t?~ Indo-
nesian people against its fellow nationals. The killing of 
thousands of people throughout the country in the weeks 
following the murder of seven Generals, mass arrest of men and 
women detentions and protracted unfair treatment, dubious 
process' of law and the widely known and publicised heavy 
sentences. 
The simplest explanation for this contradictory presenta-
tion of a single period is that the several chapters in the 
Report were written by different people, as indeed the edi-
tors say in their introduction. But more fundamentally, the 
ambiguity arises because the "PK.I-spectre" has been so 
deeply established in Indonesia that even outspoken human 
rights advocates have ignored or skirted round this "gravest 
violation" of all, either because of the risks involved or 
because some of them still believe that PKI members or 
sympathisers got all they deserved, human rights or no. But 
the author of the chapter from which the latter quotation 
is taken is Mr Yap Thiam Hien, a man who has been un-
failingly consistent in his adherence to human principles. 
The chapters on social, economic and cultural rights 
provide a great deal of useful infonnation: figures on the 
high illiteracy rate among school-age children (41.3% in 
1971, 40.3% in 1977), on the very low expenditure on 
health seMces (0.3% of GNP in 1979), and on the Iack of 
basic hygienic facilities (safe water is available to only 6.1 % 
of village dwellers). An important point too is made about 
the danger of human rights abuse in the implementation of 
the family planning programme which is being pushed at a 
time when child mortality is still very high, so that it could 
still be in the interest of parents to have more children than 
national population figures would seem to justify. The 
Report also contains a useful section on land problems and 
points out that 80% of°the 1,200 complaints made by dele-
gations who went to Parliament in 1979 were connected 
with land disputes. 
All in all, the Report provides a useful and fairly 
comprehensive pictu1e of life in Indonesia today and is 
valuable reading for anyone wishing to understand why 
there is so much social and political unrest in the country. 
It is very helpful indeed to have the document available in 
English though it must be said that the translation is not 
always very satisfactory and sometimes positively impedes 
an understanding of the text. 
CHRONOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSE IN INDONESIA, 1979/1980 
The third of TAPOL's annual Chronologies is now in 
preparation. 
Price: (approx) £1.50 plus postage. 
Please send your orders to: T APOL, 8a Treport Street, 
London SW18 2BP. 
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LAND DISPUTES 
JENGGAWAH PEASANTS ON TRIAL 
Seven peasants involved in the widely-reported land dispute 
with a state-owned tobacco plantation in Jenggawah 
District of Jember, East Java last July, were sudden!; 
summoned to court on 4th December to face a number of 
charges. (For a summary of this dispute, see TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 36, October 1979, p. 7). 
With only two days' notification of the trial, the defen-
dants' lawyers could not be present. Despite protests from 
the peasants that the charges should not be read out till the 
lawyers were present, the first hearing proceeded as 
planned. The defendants' demand that the next hearing 
should be postponed for a month was also turned down 
and the hearing was fixed for only one week hence, givin~ 
virtually no opportunity to the lawyers to prepare their 
case. 
The peasants are being charged under the 1963 anti-
subversion law and several articles of the Criminal Code. 
They are accused of holding three meetings wihout per-
mission, of organising the peasants who are involved-in the 
dispute, of continuing to protest against the arrest of two 
peasants involved in the dispute . They are also charged with 
responsibility for the damage caused to two tobacco ware-
houses which were burnt down during the course of the 
dispute. 
Four of the defendants, who are not being held in 
custody during the trial, travelled to Jakarta after the first 
hearing to submit a formal complaint to Parliament and to 
demand proper legal protection. They stressed that the 
peasants involved had been willing to accept the decision 
announced by the Governor of East Java which guaranteed 
that the size of land-holdings re-distributed to the peasants 
would not be limited to 0.3 hectares per family as the plan-
tation had originally determined, but would allow families 
to obtain larger plots in accordance with the size of their 
family. After this decision has been published, nothing fur-
ther happened, and the plantation appeared to have 
abandoned its plans to re-distribute the land. The peasants 
therefore went on cultivating the land as formerly. But 
suddenly, plantation officials appeared again, accusing them 
of working on land to which they were not entitled, and 
insisting once again that the originally proposed plan of re-
distribution of only 0.3 hectares would be fully imple-
mented. Simultaneously with this, court proceedings were 
commenced. 
Why, the peasant-defendants asked the leaders of Parlia-
ment, was the Governor's decision now being completely 
ignored? And why was it that they, who had agreed to 
accept the Governor's decision, were now being charged in 
court whereas no action was being taken against the planta-
tion officials who were ignoring this decision? 
ARRESTS IN NORTH SUMATRA 
* Eleven peasants were arrested in mid-January in the 
village of Paya Mabar, Deli Serdang District, North Sumatra 
after resisting attempts to force them off the land they till. 
The land in dispute had been grabbed from them i11 1967 
by members of the armed forces. A total of 46 peasants 
have been trying to re-possess the land. 
The arrests followed two incidents during which 
peasants who were working on the land were set upon and 
beaten up by gangs of men. In the first incident, police 
who accompanied the attackers stood by as the peasants 
were assaulted. In the second incident, six peasants under 
attack tried to defend themselves, but they were quickly 
outnumbered, and so tried to escape from their assailants. 
Soon afterwards the police appeared and arrested the six 
men , and then went to the homes of other peasants 
involved in the dispute and arrested them too. Kompas 
which reported this incident (25 January 1980) stated that 
the Police Chief of North Sumatra refused to answer any 
questions about these arrests . 
* A group of peasants in the village of Ujung Rambe, 
Bangun Purba District, North Sumatra were arrested in . 
January after attempting to defend their rights to land they 
have been tilling since 1962. Soon after the arrests, forty 
women who were wives of the arrested men, some carrying 
babies, travelled to the District Chiefs office to protest 
about the arrests. They declared that they did not feel safe 
in the village and wanted to remain there for protection 
until their husbands were released and allowed to return 
home. They had all brought mats and bundles of clothes 
with them and staged a sitdown strike on the premises. 
Eventually they were persuaded to go home without any 
settlement of their complaint (Kompas, 17 January, 1980). 
ACEHTAPOLS 
There are about 126 political prisoners in Aceh, the most 
northerly province of Sumatra, says an Indonesian lawyer 
who has writ-ten to human rights activists in the Nether-
lands asking for support to help free these prisoners. A few 
are currently being tried , and some others have already 
been tried and sentenced, but the majority, who were 
arrested in 1977 and 1978, are being held without trial. 
The prisoners are accused of involvement in the Move-
ment for an Independent Aceh. They include som~ 
prominent figures in society. 
The lawyer also points out that many others were held 
for shorter periods of time, also without trial. In some 
cases, local leaders who had been detained were only 
released, he says, after promising to vote for GOLK.AR, the 
military-backed party , at the elections held in July 1977. 
The conditions in which the prisoners are held are quite 
appalling, he says; food is very inadequate and there have 
been many cases of maltreatment. 
Aceh is a strongly Islamic region, and the PPP (the 
Moslem party) did well there at the 1977 elections. 
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GARUDA PILOTS DISMISSED 
At the end of January , the state-owned Garuda Airways 
was brought to a complete standstill by a walk-out of pilots 
in protest against the dismissal of four of their colleagues 
over a pay claim made last year. Over 130 pilots walked out 
and participated in a demonstration to Parliament de-
manding immediate re-instatement and a settlement of their 
pay dispute . 
The Army security command, KOPKAMTIB, intervened 
when chaos struck the main airports throughout the 
country, and set up a "crisis centre". Whilst cynically asser-
ting that no pilots would be dismissed over the issue, 
KOPKAMTIB Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sudomo, 
announced that all pilots employed by Garuda would be 
required to re-register for work and to give a written under-
taking that they would not engage in strike action or in 
any way disrupt flights. 
KOPKAMTIB has repeatedly intervened in the dispute, 
claiming that "national security" and "economic develop-
ment" are being put at risk. A lawyer, Mr Albert Hasibuan 
has pointed out (Kompas, 2 February 1980) that by 
accusing pilots of disturbing national development, Sudomo 
could now charge them with violating the anti-subversion 
laws of 1959 and 1963. "Don't play around with such 
charges", he warned, "for the penalties involved are ex-
tremely severe and include the death sentence". 
The conflict has been brewing since November last year 
when the pay claim was first submitted to the Garuda 
management. KORPRI, the association to which all state 
employees must belong, was brought in to find a solution, 
but since the managing-director of Garuda is also chairman 
of the KORPRI Garuda branch, it is not surprising that 
KORPRI's intervention proved fruitless. In fact all those 
who represented the pilots' side in the negotiation team 
that was set up on the orders of KOPKAMTIB to work 
out a settlement have now been dismissed. They are among 
the four men dismissed in January and another five persons 
dismissed last December. 
The pilots who went to Parliament with their complaints 
were clearly afraid of possible repercussions from their 
demonstration. Many had even brought suitcases with 
them and announced their intention to remain in the Parlia-
ment building until the dispute had been solved; some also 
said that they expected to be arrested. As discussions were 
going on, the pilots refused to leave the building until some 
progress had been made and until assurances had been given 
that no arrests would be made after they had left the 
building. The chairman and d~puty chairmen of Parliament, 
all of whom became very much involved and, according to 
some newspapers, quite agitated over the pilots' sit-down 
action, eventually secured an assurance from the Jakarta 
military command that no arrests would be made, and it 
was only after this that the pilots agreed to disband and go 
home. 
A PETTY DESPOT'S 'RECONSTRUCTION' IN MEDAN 
As the result of an understandable mistake , a respected 
Medan journalist, Yus Rivai Harahap, has been made to 
spend several days in jail, and suffer public humiliation and 
physical distress at the hands of a despotic police officer. 
On 7 December 1979, Yus hired a red Yamaha motor-
bike and parked it outside the Kisaran District Office where 
he went inside to settle some business. When he came out 
someone had parked a similar motor-bike right next to the 
one he had hired, and Yus had difficulty identifying the 
one he had used. On finding that his key fitted one of 
them, he rode away without realising that he had the wrong 
one. Meanwhile the owner of the motor-bike, Ali Amran, 
emerged from the District Office and saw at once that a 
mistake had been made, and so took Yus' hired machine to 
the police station. Later when Yus returned the motor-bike 
he was riding to Corporal Pakpahan, the owner, Pakpahan 
said he had returned the wrong motor-bike. However, 
Pakpahan quickly found his motor-bike at the police 
station and he and Ali Amran realising the mistake, 
exchanged the bikes without further ado. 
However Captain Bambang Susetyo of the police was 
not happy to let it rest at that, and decided to make a 
public spectacle of Yus. After he had spent four days in 
prison and had been refused permission to see his wife, 
Bambang had him manacled and made him walk five kilo-
metres around Medan in the hot midday sun with bare feet 
on baking asphalt, encouraging a large audience, including 
journalists, to witness Yus' discomfort. The walk was 
supposed to enable the reconstruction of the so-called 
crime and the police made Yus visit all his stops of 7 
December. Several journalists were_ upset by this treatment 
and asked Bambang why he did not conduct · the 'recon-
struction' by car, but Bambang claimed that there was no 
petrol. The journalists then offered to suppl)' petrol, but 
were told angrily by Bambang that "it was not their 
business". 
Sinar Indonesia Baru the newspaper for which Yus 
works took a very critical position on the affair, and said 
that Bambang's action was one of revenge as Sinar Indo-
nesia Baru had of ten criticised the police for torturing 
prisoners and about the widespread gambling in Kisaran. 
Many other organisations protested including the Indo-
nesian Journalists' Association legal office in Medan, and 
seven youth organisations. The head of the North Sumatra 
Police District, Brigadier General Montolalu, has said that 
Bambang's actions were imprudent and that action would 
be taken. Bambang is one of a few who may not have got 
away with despotic and arbitrary practices ... But then, he 
is not a general ... 
Source: Tempo 22 December 1979. 
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TOURISTS: 
ANOTHER INVASION 
OFTHEASMAT 
An advertisement placed in the Dutch monthly, Arts en 
Auto invites a group of fourteen Dutch people to partici-
pate in a safari to the Asmat area of West Irian so that they 
can wonder at the "primitive" practices of the Asmat 
people. The leader of this cynical expedition is a Dutch 
woman, Oedine Wittewaall, a former resident of sixteen 
years in West Irian. The cost of her expertise will be Dfl. 
14,000 (about £3,500). 
The spectacle-seekers will not be disappointed for the 
Indonesian military has provided them with much to see 
which may be recorded as "primitive". The thousands of 
West Papuans who have been forced out of towns have to 
practice a precarious subsistence agriculture in the bush and 
the jungle, in the least fertile areas which have been left 
after the transmigration programme. The hardship is'com-
pounded by the fact that the military authorities will not 
allow the West Papuan villagers to leave the immediate 
village area in districts which are regarded as insecure. This 
means that shifting cultivation cannot be practised 
effectively and nutritional levels must drop. No doubt the 
comparison between such a primitive and poor way of li(e 
will provide a comfortable contrast for Oedine's intrepi<f 
companions, and they will return home with their slides, 
colourful stories and an enhanced appreciation of Dutch 
affluence. 
BRUTALITY ON BIAK 
Baldus Mofu Dies in Prison 
The West Papuan nationalist Baldus Mofu is reported to 
MASSIVE FORCED 
RE-SETTLEMENT 
IN EAST TIMOR 
In its drive to force East Timorese people out of the 
mountain regions, the base for the protracted resistance to 
Indonesia's invasion launched in December 1975, the IPdo-
nesian government has adopted a starvation policy. Satura-
tion bombing combined with search-and-destroy missions 
and widespread defoliation has severely disrupted the tradi-
tional agricultural pursuits of the country's mountain 
people. Villagers forced to be constantly on the move have 
been unable to plant or harvest their crops. The resultant 
grave food shortages and lack of medicines and clothing 
forced more than half the total population to come down 
into the lowland areas, the only parts of the country which 
the invading troops have been able to control physically. 
At least 300,0UU people, well over one-half the total 
surviving population of East Timar, have now been herded 
into "reseUlement villages". The strategic role of this 
"resettlement" programme has been clearly described by 
Henry Kamm, in the New York Times (28 January 1980) 
who visited East Timar for one week. He writes: 
The Jakarta Government has prepared a resettlement program 
under which people are to be installed in larger groups than 
was the Timorese tradition. Villages are to be situated along the 
roads, where the inhabitants will be · accessible to public services 
such as education and health. A specialist in Timorese agri-
culture said that the plan had been drawn largely for strategic 
reasons, placing the population where the Indonesian Army can 
control it. Strongly anti-Communist, he approves of the political 
objective of keeping the people out of the reach of Fretilin 
remnants. 
However, he said, Timor has never been more than barely 
able to feed its population. The people have produced their food 
by living in small groups and exploiting all the arable valleys of 
the rugged interior. The resettlement project, the specialist said, 
will make East Timor permanently dependent on food imports. 
have died on 7 December 1979 as a result of ill-treatment .__ ___________________ _,, 
received in Biak prison. He w!ls arrested along with several 
others in July 1979 after making a speech on West Papua's 
National Day on July 1st which commemmorates the 
D.eclaration of Independence made by the Fre.e Papua 
Movem~nt leader, Seth Rumkorem, on 1 July 1971. It is 
estimated that there are some 300 political prisoners on 
Biak island alone. They are held in dreadful conditions and 
are subject to torture. 
Source: West Papua! Observer 4:2 and 4:4 
Massacre on Biak 
A group of twelve men, women and children who had 
obtained permission to gather sago outside of their village 
in north Biak, were ruthlessly shot down last year by an 
Indonesian army patrol which was looking for Free Papua 
Movement (OPM) units. It appears that the patrol later 
checked and discovered that the villagers did have a valid 
permit, but by then it was too late as they were all dead. 
Their bodies were left to be discovered some time later by 
another villager who was on his way to do some gardening. 
The informant of West Papuan Observer was reluctant to 
identify the village in north Biak where the massacre 
occurred because of fear of reprisals. 
Biak is now the centre of renewed OPM activity, but it 
has always been an area- of strong anti-colonial resistance. It 
has been reported that at the end of 1979 north and east 
Biak were subjected to heavy bombing attacks by Indo-
nesia, probably indicating that attempts by patrols to end 
OPM activity had been unsuccessful. 
Source: West Papuan Observer, 4:3 and 4:4 
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PRESS FREEDOM: 
ALI MURTOPO ELUCIDATES 
When in early December last year, KOPKAMTIB 
Commander, .Admiral Sudomo warned newspapers in Indo-
nesia against printing opinions and told them they should 
stick to facts, Vice-President Adam Malik, himself a news-
man in the old days, could not let pass an opportunity of 
reminding Sudomo that opinions were also facts , and there-
fore worthy of being reported , although to be on the safe 
side , he added that newspapers should be cautious about 
publishing opinions that could "harm the national 
interest" . 
Continued from page 7 
. tuals will be nothing more than thought machines. As 
Kenneth Galbraith has said, technostructure which already 
exists in the advanced countries is simply a means for giant 
corporations to wield control over society. 
Rationalism and bureaucratism based on the techno-
structure idea take the shape of models and formulae which 
must all conform to the wishes of those in power. The uni-
versities must conform to the will of those in power, the 
students must conform to the will of those in power. This 
is what an authoritarian , dictatorial system of government 
means. So, KNK and NKK are the political means to under-
mine social and cultural life in order to justify the authori-
tarian regime in power in this country. 
The campaign being waged by ITB students to resist the 
enforcement of normalisation has now reached the point of 
no return. It is a struggle which is aimed not only at defen-
ding the students' council and other democratic students' 
organisations; it also pursues the broader objective of free-
ing academic life from the clutches of the dictators who 
want to control everything in Indonesia. It is not only the 
implementation of normalisation that is bad, but also the 
concept on which it is based. Thus the personification of 
normalisation is not Daud Jusuf,7 but the regime itself. 
Notes 
1 GOLKAR is the party of the army, and KORPRI is the Civil 
Servants' Corps which all government employees are required to 
join. KORPRI is one of the GOLKAR organisations. 
2 This is a reference to the President's brother, Probosutejo, who 
owns the company P.T. Mercu Buana which is built on an 
official monopoly of clove exports. 
3 The Berkeley mafia refers to the techocrats in charge of Indo-
nesia's economy. They are so called as most were trained at 
Berkeley, California. 
4 . Senopati Square is the address of the State Planning Office. 
5 KNK-Konsep Normalisasi Kampws; NKK-Normalisasi Neluarga 
Kampus (Normalisation of the Campus Family). 
6 Penalaran means something reasonable or sensible, but the best 
word to use here would seem to be logic. 
7 Daud Jusuf is the Minister for Education who launched the 
normalisation policy and who is mainly rt:sponsible for its imple-
mentation in tl1t: 11niversities. 
But , for a full clarification of what newspapers are 
allowed to print and what they are not allowed to print, 
who better than the man actually in charge, the Minister of 
Information , General Ali Murtopo? We are indebted· to 
Kompas (6 December 1980) for reporting his final judge-
ment on this important question, as follows : 
Some opinions expressed by mdividuals have not been tested 
for their validity. These can be classified, he said, as opinions 
about opinions. He acknowledged that, for newspapers, these 
were facts, but taking into account the present conditions of 
Indonesian society and the educative role performe4 by the 
press, the reporting of such opinions cannot be considered as 
being educative. By reporting such opinions, newspapers would 
be publishing information that only blurs the issues ... The way 
to judge whether an opinion about an opinion should be re-
ported in the press is to decide whether it has moral value, 
whether it is in the national interest and whether it is worthy 
of being reported. 
'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan 
politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely 
used although it was banned in 197 4 because the 
military authorities said that all prisoners are 
'criminals'. 
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